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 The study sets out to measure how the taxation of dividend and debt affects 
firm  value.  Tax  hypothesis  predicts  that  firm  value  is  negatively  related  to 
dividends  and  positively  related  to  debt.  The  study  covered  1197  firm-year 
observations of manufacturing firms in Nigeria from 1984 to 2000. To achieve 
the objective, the study estimated the model on the average values for each firm 
and tested for industry effects using the ordinary least square (OLS) method. We 
found the opposite of tax hypotheses predictions from the regression results. We 
hypothesized that the relationship between dividends, debt and firm value will be 
affected by the size of the firm. We therefore partitioned the firms into two on 
the  basis  of  size  measured  as  market  capitalization.  We  estimated  separate 
equations for each sub-sample and found positive relationship between dividend 
and firm value and negative relationship between debt and firm value in both 
small-sized firms and big firms’ sub-sample. 
The  study  concludes  that  dividend  and  debt  convey  information  about 
profitability of firms. This information about firms’ profitability obscures any tax 
effect of financing decisions. However, we found that earnings and investment 
are key determinants of firm value in Nigeria. 
 
1.1 The Problem 
Tax constitutes a potentially important consideration in firms’ financing decisions. 
If a company is financed by debt capital, there will be tax relief available on 
interest payments. Alternatively, if the company is financed with shareholders’ 
fund (that is equity capital), then dividend will be paid on the equity from the 
profit after tax, which will in turn give rise to a liability for personal income tax. 
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In Nigeria, capital gains on common stock have been tax-free since 1998
3, but 
the marginal personal tax rate built into the pricing of dividend is about 19.38%
4. 
Therefore, the cost of capital of an all-equity firm that does not pay dividend will 
be less than that of a similar firm that pays dividend
5. Companies on the other 
hand  pay  40%
6  average  tax  rate  during  the  sample  period.  Since,  corporate 
interest  payments  are  deductible  before  tax;  40%  corporate  tax  savings  on 
interest deductions can lower the cost of debt to 60%, even when equity pays no 
dividends. In general, how tax treatment of dividends and debt affect the overall 
cost of capital and firm value is a high priority for research in corporate finance. 
   Over the years, researchers have examined the differential impact of the 
tax treatment of debt and dividends on corporate financial policy in developed 
countries. However, existing studies devoted to examining the impact of taxes on 
financing decisions and firm value is scanty in Nigeria. This is a gap this study 
attempts to fill. The objectives of the study are stated in section 1.2 below. 
 
 1.2. Objectives of Study 
This study evaluates the impact of taxes on corporate financing decisions and 
firm value in Nigeria. Specifically, the study sets out to: 
1. analyze the effect of tax changes on corporate financing decisions, 
2. assess how the differential tax treatment of dividends and debt affects the 
overall cost of capital and firm value. 
 
1.3.   Justification and Relevance of Study 
                                                           
3 See Table II.2 
4 This rate is obtained from personal income tax rates from lowest rate to highest bracket 
from  1999  to  2001.  The  rates  are  5%  and  10%  on  first  and  second  30000  naira 
respectively, 15% and 20% on the next first and second 50000 naira respectively and 
25% on the next 160000 naira. Personal tax payable on 320000 naira is 62000 naira and 
the average rate is 19.38%. 
 
5 This is because of the withholding tax on dividend. 
6 See table II.3 in section II.2   4 
Over  the  years,  economists  have  devoted  considerable  effort  to 
understanding the incidence of company income tax and its impact on financing 
decisions  of firms in  developed countries,  with  different  political  environment, 
especially in the United States.  However, some of the factors identified by these 
studies  may  not  be  considered  applicable  to  the  Nigerian  environment  (Ariyo 
(1988). Hence this research constitutes an attempt at a cross-cultural study of a 
phenomenon  that  may  impact  the  financing  decisions  of  corporate  firms, 
recognized in developed countries, but not previously observed in a developing 
country’s environment. These findings should provide information in developing a 
positive theory of the link between corporate finance and taxation for developing 
countries especially Nigeria. 
 
1.4.  Scope of Study 
The sample contain 85 out of the 102 manufacturing companies quoted 
on the first and second tiers of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) between 1984 
and  2000. This  represents a  sample  size of 83%;  covering  14  manufacturing 
sectors according to NSE’s classification
7. 
The choice of the quoted corporate firms is justified by their financial statements 
and information on capital market activities being publicly available.  
1984 was chosen as the base year because it was the year in which stock 
market  indexing  was  first  introduced  in  Nigeria.  The  study  period  of  1984  to 
2000  also  witnessed  some  changes  in  tax  structure,  as  well  as  major  capital 
market policy changes in Nigeria’s corporate history. The company income tax 
rate was amended in 1987, revised downwards in 1993 and 1996. Capital gains tax 
                                                           
7They  are  automobile  and  tyre,  agriculture,  breweries,  building  materials,  chemical  and  paints, 
conglomerates,  computer  and  office  equipments,  engineering  technology,  food,  beverage  and  tobacco, 
footwear, healthcare, industrial/domestic products, packaging, publishing and textiles, excluding companies 
in banking, commercial services, construction, insurance, investment companies, machinery (marketing) 
and petroleum (marketing) which are not involved in manufacturing and therefore have limited investment 
in plant and machinery and productive equipments. 
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rate was reduced in 1996 and cancelled on stock returns in 1998, while personal 
income tax rate bracket was reduced in 1989, 1997, 1998 and 2001
8. 
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 54 of 1989 which amended 
the  earlier  “indigenization  decrees  of  1972  and  1977  reduced  the  number  of 
enterprises exclusively reserved for Nigerians. The 1989 Decree, however, allowed 
foreign participation of not more than 40% equity share capital in the 40 scheduled 
enterprises exclusively reserved for Nigerians where the capitalization involved is 
not less than 20 million naira. This was eventually abolished in January 1995. The 
Nigeria  Investment  Promotion  Commission  Decree  16,  1995  and  the  Foreign 
Exchange  (Miscellaneous  Provision)  Decree  17,  1995  replaced  the  Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 54 of 1989 and The Exchange Control Act of 
1962.  Foreigners  can  now  participate  in  the  Nigerian  Capital  market  both  as 
operators and investors and there is no limit anymore to the percentage of foreign 
holding in any company registered in any Nigerian registered company. 
 
1.5. Plan of Study 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section II presents the study 
background comprising of an overview of Capital Structure of Nigerian firms and 
tax  schedules  of  Companies  and  individuals.  The  review  of  theoretical  and 
empirical literatures is presented in section III, while in section IV, the research 
methodology is discussed, the model used specified and the variables defined. 
Analysis and interpretation of findings are presented in Section V, while summary 
of major findings, conclusions and recommendations are discussed in section VI. 
 
II. Study Background 
II.1. Financing Pattern of Nigerian Manufacturing Sector 
                                                           
8 See table II.2 and II.3 in section II.2 below. 
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Manufacturing firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange are financed by 
equity and debt as shown in Table 2.1. The table shows that, on average, the 
capital  structure  of  86  corporate  manufacturing  firms  17  years  from  1984  to 
2000 consisted of 99.27 per cent equity and 0.73 per cent debt. The positive bias 
towards  equity  financing  may  be  due  to  financial  regulations  making  equity 
financing more accessible to firms than debt, or firms preferring equity to debt 
financing as a result of lower cost of capital.
9 
 
Table 4.5 Financial Structure of Manufacturing Firms in Nigeria (86 Firms from 1984-2000 in %)   
Year  Equity/CE  Std/CE  Ltd/CE  Tdebt/CE  Inflat_rate  CB Lrate  MB Lrate*  Industrial Loan  
           (max)  (max)  Coupon rate (max) 
1984  98.92  0.83  0.24  1.08  39.60  13.00    9.00   
1985  98.53  1.18  0.29  1.47  5.50  11.75    9.50   
1986  99.17  0.61  0.22  0.83  5.40  12.00    9.50   
1987  99.04  0.72  0.24  0.96  10.20  19.20    11.75   
1988  98.96  0.79  0.25  1.04  38.30  17.60  17.63  13.00   
1989  99.13  0.53  0.34  0.87  40.90  24.60  29.15  12.00   
1990  99.43  0.29  0.28  0.57  7.50  27.70  28.67  19.00   
1991  99.43  0.31  0.26  0.57  13.00  20.80  20.94  18.00   
1992  99.39  0.36  0.25  0.61  44.50  31.20  36.10  19.00   
1993  99.34  0.43  0.23  0.66  57.20  18.32  62.70  22.00   
1994  99.40  0.42  0.18  0.60  57.00  21.00  21.40  25.00   
1995  99.42  0.44  0.13  0.58  72.80  20.79  21.00  24.00   
1996  99.75  0.20  0.05  0.25  29.30  20.86  20.72  27.00   
1997  99.81  0.16  0.03  0.19  8.50  23.32  21.35  28.00   
1998  99.46  0.50  0.03  0.54  10.00  25.51  23.81  28.00   
1999  99.28  0.65  0.07  0.72  6.60  26.12  33.15  27.00   
2000  99.10  0.82  0.08  0.90  6.90  21.82  26.20  26.00   
Average  99.27  0.54  0.19  0.73  26.66  20.92  27.91  19.28   
Note:                   
CE is capital employed, std is short term debt, ltd is long term debt, tdebt is        
total debt, infl_rate is inflation rate, CBL is commercial bank lending rate,        
MBL is lending rate and Industrial loan coupon rate (max) is interest rate on        
                                                           
9 Shareholders fund comprises of equity and reserves. Reserves are made up of capital 
and revenue reserves. Retained earnings form part of revenue reserves and it has the same 
cost  as  equity.  With  reduction  in  the  transaction  cost  of  new  issue,  the  cost  of 
shareholders’ fund is lower than the cost of debt capital. 
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Industrial loans, debentures or bonds. 
*computation of deposit and lending rates for 
merchant banks started in 1988.      
           
Source: Computed from the Annual Reports and Accounts of Companies and        
Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact Books, 1984-2003, Central Bank of Nigeria:        
Statistical Bulletin and Nigerian Stock Exchange Daily Official price List,        
Closing Price List (1984-2000)               
                   
 
Table 2.1 shows that as inflation and interest rates in both commercial 
bank  and  industrial  loans  increase,  the  proportion  of  equity  in  the  financial 
structure reveals a high trend consistently.  The lending rate in Nigerian banks
10 
ranged from 11.75% to 62.70 % per annum between 1984 and 2000, while that 
of  community  banks  was  84  %  per  annum  (7%  per  month)  as  at  2000
11.  
Borrowers are expected to provide adequate collateral in order to obtain loan 
from the financial market, and many may be unable to do so. 
However,  there  is  the  general  illusion  of  costlessness  associated  with 
retained  earnings  and  internal  funds  in  Nigeria.  Particularly,  long-term  debt 
exhibits a low trend even with rising inflation and interest rates. Rising trend in 
interest on long-term debt reflects an increase in market perception of financial 
risk.  Increase  in  inflation  and  tax  shield  associated  with  tax  deductibility  of 
interest rates is expected to make debt a  more attractive source of financing 
than equity as it pays companies to borrow during inflation. Unwillingness on the 
part of many firms to dilute ownership and make their financial and non-financial 
information available to the public should also result in increase in the use of 
debt to finance investments. Despite an increase in inflation and interest rates, 
                                                           
10 With the introduction of universal banking in 2000, there is no distinction between commercial and 
merchant banks.   8 
the proportion of debt is very low. The financing structure of the firms remains 
positively biased towards equity despite the tax advantage of debt.  
Removal of restrictions on repatriation of dividends,  profits and loan in 
1995 and removal, imposition and modification of interest rate control between 
1984 and 2000 has contributed to the jumps in interest rates during the period, 
with the attendant effect of making debt (external fund) to be more costly than 
equity. 
 
II.2 Tax Rates and Dividend Pattern of Nigerian Firms 
Table 2.2 presents the personal income tax rates; capital gains tax rates, 
company income tax rates and dividend pay out of Nigerian firms. The average 
dividend pay out ratio (adjusted for cash and stock dividend) as a percentage of 
profit after tax is about 47 percent while the pay out ratio as a percentage of 
total distributable earnings
12 are about 15 percent.  In Nigeria the capital gains 
tax is lower than personal tax rate on dividend. 
 
Table 2.2 Tax Rates and Dividend Behaviour 












1984  10%-70%  20%  45%  43.25  15.04 
1985  10%-70%  20%  45%  43.13  17.34 
1986  10%-70%  20%  45%  47.28  15.16 
1987  10%-55%  20%  40%  40.21  15.01 
1988  10%-55%  20%  40%  49.82  18.30 
1989  10%-55%  20%  40%  41.89  18.06 
1990  10%-55%  20%  40%  44.49  13.95 
1991  10%-55%  20%  40%  41.38  16.04 
1992  10%-55%  20%  40%  45.23  14.42 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Information was obtained from discussions with different bank managers in Ibadan, Nigeria 
 
12 Total distributable earnings is the sum of profit after tax and revenue reserve. Revenue reserves consist of 
retained profit from previous years. Dividend can be paid out of present profit after tax and revenue 
reserves, which has been accumulated overtime. 
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1993  10%-55%  20%  35%  46.93  14.98 
1994  10%-55%  20%  35%  49.48  16.21 
1995  10%-55%  20%  35%  36.98  13.51 
1996  10%-55%  10%  30%  69.32  14.31 













Average        47.20  15.42 
Small Companies: Concessionary company income tax rate of 20% 
Note: PIT is personal income tax, CGT is capital gains tax, and CIT is company income tax. 
Source: Adelegan (2000), Federal Inland Revenue Services (2000), Ariyo (1997), Ikokwu (2002). 
 
 
Company income tax rate was 45% in 1984, 35% from 1993 to 1995 and 30% 
from 1996 to date. The reduction of the average tax rate is expected to have a 
positive effect on business financing and leverage.  
 
III. Literature Review 
In the literature, factors such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, 
proxy effects and asymmetric information are suggested as playing a role in the 
relation between firm value and financing decisions. However, with the exception 
of taxes, factors linking value and financing decisions operate through pre-tax 
profitability.  
In  agency-cost  models,  financing  decisions  affect  value  because  they 
produce behaviour that affects profitability. Jensen and Meckling (1976) submit 
that higher leverage allows manager to hold a larger part of its common stock 
and this reduces agency problems by closely aligning the interest of the manager 
and  other  stockholders.  According  to  Jensen  (1986)  leverage  also  enhances 
value by forcing the firm to pay out resources that might otherwise be wasted on 
bad investments by managers. Fama and Miller (1972) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that leverage can also increase the incentive of the stockholders to 
make risky investment that shift wealth from bondholders but do not maximize 
the combined wealth of security holders. Myers (1977) argue that leverage can 
make firms to under invest because the gains from investments are shared with 
the  existing  risky  bonds of  the  firm.  The  agency effects  of financing decision   10 
work  through  profitability  and  they  can  make  firms  to  take  better  or  worse 
investments  and  to  use  assets  more  or  less  efficiently.  In  the  pecking  order 
model and asymmetric information problems that arise when issuing debt and 
equity cause firms to prefer internal financing. External financing is seen as bad 
news about earnings (Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984)). The proxy effect 
of Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1961) suggest that dividends convey information 
about expected earnings beyond that in measured earnings and are related to 
value. 
  Brennan (1970) suggests that higher dividend pay out policies lower stock 
prices  because  dividends  are  taxed  at  a  higher  rate  than  capital  gains  and 
predicts that dividend slopes in cross-section regression will be negative. Miller 
and Scholes (1978), on the other hand, argued that taxes on dividends could be 
avoided  by  investing  in  stocks  through  retirement  plans  or  by  offsetting 
deductions  of  personal  interest  payments.  Firm  value  is  not  affected  in  their 
model  because  dividend  and  capital  gains  are  priced  as  if  they  are  tax-free.  
Miller  and  Scholes  (1982)  also  hypothesized  that  firm  value  is  unaffected  by 
dividend policy because pricing is dominated by investors subject to symmetric 
taxation of dividends and capital gains and they predict that dividend slopes will 
be zero. 
  On  the  tax  effects  of  debt,  Miller  (1977)  argue  that  common  stock  is 
priced  as  if  it  is  tax-free,  but  the  personal  tax  rate  built  into  the  pricing  of 
corporate interest payments is the corporation tax rate. Here, the debt tax shield 
at the corporate level is offset by taxes on interest at the personal level, and 
debt does not affect firm value. Miller and Scholes (1978) consider a situation in 
which  investors  avoid  personal  taxes  on  all  returns  on  investment,  and  all 
corporate  securities  are  priced  as  if  they  are  tax-free.  Modigliani  and  Miller 
(1963)  argue  that  corporate  debt  tax  shield  will  increase  firm  value  by  the 
market value of the corporate tax savings on expected interest payments. The 
predictions of these hypotheses for the debt slopes will depend on whether or 
not we control for profit before or after tax. Miller (1977) submits that if there   11 
are two firms with the same earnings before interest and taxes, the more levered 
firm’s higher after-tax earnings are just offset by the higher personal taxes paid 
by its bondholders. Given pre-tax earnings, there is no relation between debt and 
value. But the more levered firm has lower value because its investors pay more 
taxes, if two-firms have the same earnings after tax. Therefore, the relationship 
between debt and value is negative when after tax earnings is controlled for. In 
contrast, Modigliani and Miller (1963) predict a positive relation between debt 
and value in regressions that control for earnings before tax because earnings 
before tax do not capture the debt tax shield. Profit after tax captures the benefit 
of interest deductions. Thus there is no relation between debt and value when 
controlling for earnings after tax.                      
Despite the importance of the link between taxes, financing decisions and 
firm value, the available empirical evidences are not really convincing on how 
taxes affect the pricing of dividends and debt. Elton and Gruber (1970) find that 
personal taxes make dividends less valuable than capital gains, stock prices fall 
by less than the full amount of the dividend on ex-dividend days. Their findings 
support the predictions of the hypothesis. However, Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) 
argue that taxes do not explain this result. They find that ex-day price drop for 
stock dividend is also less than the amount of dividend, though stock dividends 
have no tax consequences. 
A negative tax effect in the pricing of dividend predicts a positive relation 
between  expected  stock  return  and  the  proportion  of  the  expected  return 
received  as  dividend,  usually  proxied  by  the  dividend/price  ratio.  Black  and 
Scholes  (1974),  Blume  (1980)  and  Miller  and  Scholes  (1982)  tested  this 
prediction  and  no  consensus  emerges.  The  results  are  sensitive  to  the  way 
dividend/price ratio is measured. 
Exchange offers produce evidence that corporate debt may have large tax 
benefit  that  increase  firm value.  Masulis (1980)  discovered  that  exchanges of 
debt for equity produce higher stock prices, while exchanges of equity for debt 
lower prices of stock. Masulis and Korwar (1986) claimed that new equity issues   12 
lower stock prices while Vermaelen (1981) assert that equity repurchases raise 
stock prices.  These results are explained in term of Myers and Majluf (1984) 
hypothesis at firms end to issue equity when it is over-valued, so new issues 
meet with price discounts. Eckbo (1986) concluded that the information effects 
of  changes  in  equity,  rather  than  the  tax  effects  of  changes  in  debt,  explain 
Masulis’  findings  on  exchange  offers  and  is  reinforced  by  the  evidence  that 
increases in debt rather that do not involve reductions in equity produce weak 
stock price responses.  
Miller (1977) hypothesis that there is a personal tax discount in the pricing 
of corporate interest payments that can eliminate the corporate tax benefit of 
debt. This is supported by the fact that yields on corporate bonds are higher 
than yields on nontaxable bond. The taxable-nontaxable yield spread does not 
provide  much  evidence  about  the  effects  of  personal  taxes  on  the  prices  of 
corporate bond. Arbitrage by banks in the United States ensured that short-term 
interest rates on municipal bond differed from short-term taxable rates by the 
company tax rate (Skelton (1983)). The arbitrage relation operates irrespective 
of the tax bracket built into the pricing of taxable interest and investors in high 
tax bracket can rationally hold tax-free bonds at lower yields than taxable bonds, 
whatever the tax bracket implicit in the pricing of taxable interest. Modigliani and 
Miller  (1963), in contrast argue that debt has net tax benefits because in their 
world, there is a positive relation between debt and value when we control for 
after-tax earnings.  
Mackie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) find that companies with high 
marginal tax rates are more likely to issue debt than firms with low marginal tax 
rates, although this does not imply that debt increases firm value. Miller (1977) 
asserts that where there is no relation between debt and firm value, firms issue 
debt only when they expect to use the interest deductions to offset taxes.  
Fama and French (1998) measured tax effect in the pricing of debts and 
dividends using cross-section regression of firm value on earnings, investment 
and  financing  variable.  Their  approach  is  based  on  the  observation  that  the   13 
market value of a firm is the market value of an all-equity no-dividends firm with 
the same pre-tax expected net cash flows, plus the value of the tax effect of the 
firm’s  expected  dividend  and  interest  payments.  Other  variables  in  their 
regressions were meant to capture all the information about expected net cash 
flow in financing decisions, and the slopes on dividend and debt variables is to 
isolate tax effects. However, Fama and French’s (1998) results do not produce 
reliable evidence of tax effects. The marginal relation between firm value and 
dividends is positive. Since there is no reason to expect a positive tax effect in 
the  pricing  of  dividends,  they  infer  that  dividends  convey  information  about 
profitability missed by the control variables. Their findings on the tax benefit of 
leverage  meet  similar  identification  problems.  The  marginal  relation  between 
leverage and value is negative, rather than positive. Their result is linked with 
Miller’s hypothesis that leverage has no net tax benefits because personal taxes 
on  interest  offset  the  corporate  tax  saving.  The  result  shows  that  leverage 
conveys information about profitability that is missed by the control variables. 
The  relations  between  financing  decision  and  value  they  observed  are 
unidentified mixes of tax effect and factors that affect profitability. 
The impact of differential treatment of debt and dividends on corporate 
financial decision has been the subject of considerable research and scrutiny by 
financial  economists  in  developed  nations;  the  available  empirical  studies  are 
scanty in Nigeria. However, corporate studies in Nigeria has been concentrated 
on  estimation  of  corporate  cost  of  capital  (Akintola-Bello  and  Adedipe,  1983, 
Inanga, 1987 and Adelegan, 2001), financing decisions (Soyode, 1978, Oyejide, 
1987,  Soyibo,  1996,  Ariyo,  1999,  Salami,  2000  and  Adenikinju,  2002)  and 
determinants  of  dividend  decisions  (Uzoaga  and  Alozieuwa,  1974;  Inanga, 
1975,1978; Soyode, 1975; Oyejide, 1976; Odife, 1977, Ariyo, 1984, Odedokun, 
1995,  Izedonmi  and  Eriki,  1996,  Adelegan,  2000,  2001b,  2002,  2003a  &  b, 
Adelegan  and  Inanga, 2001).   14 
Studies on estimation of corporate cost of capital obtained estimates of 
42% and 37% for returns on investment in Cocoa research between 1978 and 
1982  and  estimates  of  13.5%  and  25.75  cost  of  equity  for  corporate  firms 
between 1977 and 1981. 
Studies on financing decisions provide evidence that Nigerian firms relied 
heavily  on  internal  funds  or  retained  earnings  in  financing  their  activities, 
followed  by  equity  and  then  debt.  The  argument  advanced  for  this  was  the 
illusion of costlessness usually associated with retained earnings. 
  The issues that drive dividend policy decisions of companies did not receive 
any serious attention among academic scholars in Nigeria until 1974 when Uzoaga 
and Alozieuwa attempted to highlight the pattern of dividend policy pursued by 
Nigerian firms particularly during the period of indegenization decree. Their study 
covered 52 company - year of dividend action (13 companies for four years).  They 
claimed that they "checked but found very little evidence" to support the classical 
influence that determine dividend policies in Nigeria during these period.  They 
concluded that fear and resentment seem to have taken over from the classical 
forces. 
  However, Inanga (1975) and Soyode (1975) commented on the work of 
Uzoaga and Alozieuwa. Inanga concluded that the problem arising from the change 
in dividend policy could be attributed to the share pricing policy of the Capital Issue 
Commission (CIC), which seemed to have ignored the classical factors that should 
govern  the  pricing  of  equity  shares  issues.    This  in  turn  made  companies  to 
abandon "all the classical forces that determine dividend policy". Soyode criticized 
Uzoaga and Alozieuwa's work on the ground that it glossed over some important 
determinants of optimal dividend policy and questioned certain conclusions made in 
the study because they are inadequate or a mistaken evaluation.  He concluded 
among other things that "constant cash needs and simultaneous cash inflow from   15 
Nigerianised shares would suggest a reduced need for retained  earnings  and a 
good reason to want to pay higher dividends". 
  Moreover, Inanga (1978) also studied the dividend behavior of corporate 
firms  in  Nigeria  around  the  indigenization  period.  Using  data  from  27  Nigerian 
quoted companies, he analyzed the size of the companies by examining their paid-
up capital and discovered that there was a gradual decline in the number of small 
companies over the five-year period and an increase in the number of medium and 
large  companies  in  the  same  period.  According  to  him,  this  general  trend  is 
explained by the compliance of the affected companies with the requirements of 
the indigenization decree, which resulted in increase in the number in their issued 
share capital. “Thus, even if each of the companies were to have continued to pay 
the same rate of dividend during the period (1969-1973) as before, one would 
expect an increase in  the  absolute amount  distributed to  shareholders. He also 
examined the pattern of dividend distribution. According to him “in 1969 well over 
50 per cent of the companies were paying dividends of 20 per cent of nominal 
capital or less, but by 1973, the number paying dividend at this rate had declined 
drastically. Besides, prior to 1972, no company paid over 10 per cent dividend, but 
shortly  after  the  decree,  18  per  cent  were  paying  dividends  at  rate  ranging 
between 130 and 260 per cent”. The drastic change in dividend policy could not 
have  been  dictated  by  a  corresponding  improvement  in  earnings  performance 
because  this  would  normally  have  a  lagged  rather  than  sudden  effect  on 
corresponding  increase  in  dividends.  He  concluded  that  the  major  contributory 
factor were the prices set by the Capital Issue Commissions for the shares offered 
by the companies concerned.  The fear of under-subscription from past experience 
of the Nigerian market to absorb large offering of shares, the consequent problem 
of some governmental agency or financial intermediaries to underwrite the shares 
under-subscribed by the public made Capital Issue Commissions to price shares low 
to  avoid  a  repeat  of  it.  The  affected  companies  then  distributed  what  already 
legally belong to the owner since the proceeds from the issue could not adequately 
have compensated them for the impending loss in earnings and some control.   16 
  Furthermore, Oyejide (1976) empirically tested for company dividend policy 
in Nigeria using Lintner's model as modified by Brittain on 19 quoted companies 
from 1969-1976.  He disagreed with previous studies and concluded "the available 
evidence provides a strong and unequivocal support for the conventional devices 
for  explaining  the  dividend  behavior  of  Nigerian  limited  liability  business 
organization". Odife (1977) criticized Oyejide's study for failing to adjust for stock 
dividend. According to him “nearly all the companies had at least one major bonus 
issue  or  stock  dividend  during  the  period.  The  incidence  of  the  bonus  issues 
increased rapidly after the first indigenization decree. The relevance of the bonus 
issues is that for any analysis, whose aim is to explain dividend policy, adjustments 
must be made for stock dividend. …Indeed the incidence and size of the stock 
dividends during the later part of the period suggest that the real rate of dividend 
payments may indeed have been quite high and would only have been revealed by 
proper adjustments”. He seemed to agree with Uzoaga and Alozieuwa's conclusion 
that the high earnings payment ratio on the wake of indegenization policy might 
have  introduced  an  element  of  uncertainty  which  may  have  motivated  many 
foreign investors to seek to realize a good proportion of their investment and hence 
reduce their risk. 
  The inconclusive controversy seems to have come to a temporary halt in 
late  70s.  Ariyo,  1984  evaluate  the  implication  of  corporate  dividend  policy 
behaviour explainable by the conventional Lintner model on economic growth with 
reference  to  Nigeria.  He  argued  that  Lintner  model  is  biased  in  favour  of 
downward-inflexible, high dividend payout behaviour by management. His study 
also indicates that institutional and environmental factors, and or the self-interest 
motives of management dictate such behaviour. Given the assumptions underlying 
his analysis, such behaviour is considered not conducive to economic growth.   
  In 1996, Izedonmi and Eriki studied the payout ratio, dividend per share and 
earnings per share of 13 Nigerian quoted companies for 6 years (1984-1989). They 
concluded that “Nigerian quoted companies are interested in maintaining the level 
of their dividend and they hardly reduce dividend even in the face of declining   17 
earnings per share”. Nigerian companies Chief Executive Officers (CEO) pay more 
attention to liquidity and legal provisions in their dividend decisions. They observed 
that the companies do not maintain a target payment ratio. Nevertheless, they also 
discovered that in an attempt to maintain stability in the amount of dividend paid, 
where  a  company experienced  high  earnings,  it  kept dividend  paid constant  or 
increased slightly. They observed that variations in the pay-out ratio across sample 
and also even within a particular company from year to year and they agree with 
Lintner’s (1956) that dividend payment may be influenced by long-term earnings 
because the pattern of earnings of the company will tend to influence the board of 
directors’ decision of dividend matters. 
Adelegan,  2000,  2002,  2003a  &  b  and  Adelegan  and  Inanga,  2001 
empirically  estimate  the  extent  to  which  the  received  theory  about  the 
conventional determinants of dividend behavior of corporate firms explains the 
dividend behaviour of quoted firms in Nigeria.  The study conclude that dividend 
policy  of  corporate  firms  in  Nigeria  seems  to  be  significantly  influenced  by  a 
number of factors which differs substantially from what is common in developed 
countries. Nigerian government through its economic policy also plays a major 
role  in  dividend  decision  making  process.  Factors  that  mainly  influenced  the 
dividend policy of quoted firms in Nigeria are after tax earnings, economic policy 
changes (due to the partial liberalization of the indigenization decree in 1989 and 
the  subsequent  simultaneous  abolition  of  the  indigenization  decree  and 
promulgation  of  the  Investment  promotion  decree  of  1995),  firm  growth 
potentials and long term debt. The empirical result reveals that the relationship 
between  the  conventional  Lintner  model  and  dividend  behaviour  of  corporate 
firms in Nigeria, although remote, depends partly on the growth opportunities, 
firm size and the level of gearing of corporate firms. 
However, there are lots of questions left unanswered by previous studies 
on  financing  decisions  and  dividend  behaviour  in  the  Nigerian  context  in 
particular.  They  are  silent  on  the  questions:  Do  tax  changes  affect  corporate 
financing  decisions?  How  does  the  taxation  of  dividends  and  debt  affect   18 
corporate financing decisions and firm value? Does firm size influence the effect 
of  taxes  on  financing  decisions?  The  study  attempts  to  provide  empirical 
evidence on the effects of taxes on business financing decisions and firm value in 
Nigeria. 
 
IV. Research Methodology 
IV.1 Model Specifications 
Factors  such  as  taxes,  bankruptcy  costs,  agency  costs  and  asymmetric 
information are suggested in the literatures as playing a role in the relationship 
between firm value and financing decisions. With the exception of taxes all other 
factors linking firm value and financing decisions operate through profit before 
tax
13. The dependent variable in equation 1 is the spread of value over cost, 
while  the  explanatory  variables  include  past,  current  and  future  values  of 
dividends, interests, earnings and investment expenditures.  
Equation 1 is given as: 
VCA a a ETA a dETA a dETA a dA a dA
b INTA b dINTA b dINTA b TDIV b dTDIV
b dTDIV c dVA
t t t t t t
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where: VCAt is Vt - At, 
VCAt is the spread of value over cost, Vt is the total market value of a firm, At is 
the  book  value  of  its  assets,  ETAt  is  current  earnings  before  interest  and 
extraordinary  items  but  before  depreciation  and  taxes,  INTAt  is  the  interest 
expense for fiscal year t, TDIVt is the dividend pay out ratio which is the total 
dividend paid divided by the total distributable earnings. Total assets At deflator 
defined  as  the  sum  of  fixed  and  current  assets  was  used  to  deflate  all  the 
variables in equation1. If absolute values are used the results are likely to be 
dominated  by  the  largest  firms  and  heteroscedasticity  is  likely  to  cloud 
                                                           
13 Our approach influenced by Fama and French (1998) and it is based on the assumption that 
the market value of a firm is the market value of an all-equity no-dividends firm with expected 
net cash flows before tax plus the value of the tax effects of the firm’s expected net cash flows in 
financing decisions. The slopes on dividend and debt variable isolate tax effects.   19 
inferences. Scaling the dependent and independent variable down by total assets 
will help  to  address these problems. However, only TDIVt is not scaled by At 
because it is the ratio of dividend to total distributable earnings.  
To measure the tax effects of financing decisions, we control the equation 
for  profitability,  which  is  measured  as  expected  net  cash  flows.  Cash  flow  is 
earnings  before  tax  plus  adjustments  for  items  that  does  not  involve  the 
movement of cash such as provision for depreciation.  The current (ETAt), past 
(dETAt)  and future  earnings  variables  (dETAt+2) in  equation (1)  are  meant  to 
capture  the  profit  part  of  expected  net  cash  flows.  ETAt  is  as  defined  earlier 
measuring the current level of profit. Fama (1990) has provided evidence that 
two years is about as far ahead as the market can predict. We therefore used a 
two-year future change in earnings. dETAt  and dETAt+2  proxy for the expected 
growth of profits, where dETAt is change in earnings and dETAt+2   is two-year 
future change in earnings. dAt and dAt+2 which is defined as one year and two-
year change in fixed assets respectively proxy for the net investment component 
of expected net cash flow.  
In measuring the effect of tax policy on financing decisions, the level of 
expected  future  dividends  and  interest  payments  are  expected  to  affect  firm 
value. The tax disadvantage of dividends and the tax advantage of debt depend 
on  the  amount of  expected  dividends and  interest  (Fama  and  French,  1998). 
TDIVt,  dTDIVt  and  dTDIVt+2  capture  current,  past  and  expected  growth  of 
dividend pay out ratio while INTAt, dINTAt and dINTAt+2 are meant to proxy for 
the current, past and expected growth of interest. 
Changes  in  dividend  pay  out  ratio  and  leverage  policy  is  expected  to 
convey information about expected dividend and interest payments. According to 
Lintner (1956) the usual proxy for a firm’s dividend policy is its target ratio of 
dividends  to  earning.  However,  the  ratio  of  dividend  to  earnings  becomes 
meaningless when earnings are  negative  or close  to zero.  Since dividend can 
actually be paid out of total distributable earning which includes current earning   20 
plus revenue reserves, we use the ratio of dividend to total distributable earnings 
(TDE) to measure dividend policy. Therefore, TDIVt is  DIVt/TDEt.  
The equation that incorporates the leverage and dividend policy is equation (2): 
VCA a a ETA a dETA a dETA a dA a dA
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dINTAt is d (INTt / At ) and dINTAt+2 is D(INTt+2 / At+2 ) which are the change in 
the ratio of interest to book value of asset, 
dTDIVt+2  is d (DIVt / TDEt ) and dTDIVt+2 is d(DIVt+2 / TDEt+2 )  which are the 
change in the ratio of dividend to total distributable earnings.  
INTAt is a direct measure of book leverage. If the agency cost of debt are high 
for intangible assets like future growth opportunities, then target leverage may 
be  closely  related  to  book  leverage  (Myer  (1977),  Fama  and  French  (1998)), 
therefore book leverage is probably informative abut leverage policy. Following 
Kothari and Shanken (1992) and Fama and French 1998), we used the two-year 
change  in  market  value  dV  (dVt+2)  which  is  (Vt+2  -  Vt)  to  purge  other  future 
change of their unexpected components. 
The  dependent  variable  in  equations  3  and  4  below  is  the  two-year 
change in the spread of value over cost, D(Vt - At) = [(Vt - At) - (Vt+2 - At-2)], all 
explanatory variables are also changes. The change equations are similar to the 
level equations. Equations (3) and (4) are stated below: 
dVC a a dETA a dETA a dA a dA b dINTA
b dINTA b dTDIV b dTDIV c dVA
t t t t t t
t t t t
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where: dVC= d (Vt-At )/ At  
and 
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where: 
d (INTAt )= d(INTt/At ), d(INTAt+2 )= d(INTt+2/At ), 
d (TDIVt.)= d (TDIVt/At ), d(TDIVt+2)= d(TDIVt+2/At ). 
Equations (3) and (4) are expected to largely identify unexpected effects, that is, 
information about earnings, investment and financing decisions available at t that 
was not available at t-2. This explains why equations (3) and (4) do not include 
lagged explanatory variables. The change regressions in equations (3) and (4) 
are similar to the event studies that dominate the literature on the response of 
value to unexpected earning, investment and financing decisions. The change 
equations  measure  the  cumulative  effects  of  unexpected  events  over  a  long 
(two-year) horizon, whereas event studies focus on specific announcement at a 
point-in-time (Fama and French (1998).  
 
IV.2 Estimation Procedure 
The models presented in the preceding sections was estimated and analyzed for 
the  entire  study  period  using  ordinary  least  square.  A  firm  is  included  in  the 
sample only if its relevant financial and market information are available both in 
its year end annual reports and the Nigerian Stock Exchange daily official lists for 
the period 1984 to 2000 and its month of fiscal year end must not have changed 
from t-2 and t+2.  
Fama and French (1992) and (1998) argue that two variables, firm size 
and the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME), captures the cross-section 
of expected stock returns fairly. Motivated by this evidence, we therefore divide 
the sample of firms into groups with our sorting criteria focusing on market and 
firms characteristics. We broke the firm into two groups on the basis of firm size 
(measured  as  stock  price  multiplied  by  shares  outstanding).  We  estimate 
separate equations for each sub sample.  
We estimate equation (1) to (4) using ordinary least square. The data sources 
are discussed in section IV.3 below.   22 
 
IV.3.   Data Sources 
Data used in this study are mainly from secondary sources, which include the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange fact books, annual reports of companies; Nigerian Stock 
Exchange daily official lists for the first and the last day of trading in each of the 
months covered in  the study. Nigerian Stock  Exchange is a reliable source of 
data of quoted companies because the companies are mandatorily required to 
submit  their  financial  reports  to  the  Nigerian  Stock  Exchange  quarterly  and 
biannually. Company annual reports are also reliable because they are statutorily 
required to be audited by recognized auditing firms before publications. 
  
V. Results and Discussions 
 V.1 Sample Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics of the 85 firms from 1984 to 2000 covering 1197 firm-
year study are in table 5.1. The unbalanced sample of 85 firms was averaged 
over  the entire  study  period.  The table  indicates that on  average  earnings  is 
about 10% of the book value of assets, investment is about 18%, dividend pay-
out is about 29%, the excess of value over cost is about 10% and interest is 
about 13% of book value of assets. 
 
Table 5.1 Sample Summary Statistics for  85 firms  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
VCA  0.10  0.12  0.03  0.78 
ETA  0.10 
         
0.51  0.03  2.07 
dETA  0.02 
         
0.09  0.02  0.73 
dET2A  0.00  0.09  0.03  0.2 
dA  0.18  0.12  0.19  0.87 
d2A  0.40  0.58 
             
0.27  2.2 
INTA  0.13  0.47  0.01  4.35 
TDIV  0.29  0.18  0.25  0.91 
dINTA  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.15 
dTDIV  0.05  0.03  0.01  5.78 
dTDI2V  0.31  1.78  0.08  16.21 
dINT2A  0.04  0.06  0.00  0.28   23 
dV2A  0.49  0.43 
           
0.55  1.86 
dDINTA  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.06 
dDINT2A  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.28 
dDTDIV  0.01  0.1  0.01  0.29 
dTDIV2  0.01  0.12  0.02  0.72 
dVC  0.15  0.3  0.22  1.78 
dD2INT  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.21 
dDIVI  0.03  0.24  0.00  1.09 
Source: Author’s computations based on samples. 
The estimates reported here are obtained by using  Limdep 7.0 (1997 version). 
 
 
V.2 Regression Results 
V.2. 1 Earning, Investment and Industry Effect.  
Table  5.2  presents  the  regression  results  of  the  four  equations  previously 
specified.  
 
Table 5.2 Cross Section OLS Regression Results for 85 firms from 1984-2000 
Dependant variable   VCA  VCA  DVC  DVC   
Variables    Eq. 1  Eq.2  Eq.3  Eq.4   
Intercept    0.15  0.13  0.17  0.19   
    1.08  0.78  1.72*  2.09**   
ETA    2.87  2.66       
    3.77***  3.51***       
dETA    -4.89  -6.48  -2.7  -3.01   
    -4.18***  -5.14***  -3.83***  -3.86*** 
dET2A    0.22  0.11  0.35  -0.02   
    0.34  0.15  0.75  -0.004   
dA    -1.61  1.62  -0.28  -0.31   
    -2.94***  -2.57**  -0.65  -0.7   
d2A    -0.44  -0.56  -0.31  -0.46   
    -2.49***  -3.26***  -2.35**  -3.84*** 
INTA    -0.14  -0.18       
    -0.93  -1.83*       
dINTA    -2.57    -0.86     
    -1.01    -0.64     
dINT2A    -1.12    -0.86     
    -1.04    -1.21     
TDIV    0.18  0.28       
    0.59  0.72       
dTDIV    0.14    0.017     
    2.16**    0.031     
dTDI2V    0.01         
    0.56         
dTDIV2      0.97  0.27       24 
      1.87  0.72     
dDTDIV      1.41    0.97   
      2.34**    2.18**   
dDIVI          0.31   
          1.77*   
dDINTA      -5.35    2.08   
      -1.35    0.72   
dDINT2A      -1       
      -0.73       
dD2INT          -1.44   
          -1.51   
dV2A    0.58  0.65  0.54  0.59   
    3.31***  3.71***  4.48***  4.9***   
Adj. R2    38.71%  41.01%  28.41%  33.32%   
Dur-Wat.    2.04  1.95  1.91  1.73   
               
Source: Author’s computations based on samples. 
The estimates reported here are obtained by using  OLS procedure in Limdep 7.0 (1997 version). 
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
In equation 1 and 2 in table 5.2, the spread of value over cost (VCA) is 
regressed with past, current and future values of earnings, investment (that is 
change in the book value of assets), dividends and interest on debt. In equations 
3 and 4, we regressed the change in the spread of value over cost with changes 
in earnings, investment, dividend and interest.  
The regression results of equations 1 and 2 presented in columns 2 and 3 
shows that past and current earnings and investments are strongly related to the 
spread of value over cost. The change regression 3 and 4 also show a strong 
relationship  between  value  and  unexpected  earnings  and  investment.    The 
strong  relations  between  earnings  and  investment  show  that  these  variables 
provide  a  control  for  profitability  that  allows  us  to  identify  tax  effects  in  the 
relationship  between  value  and  financing  decisions.  Investment  captures  the 
information  about  expected  profits  missed  by  measuring  earnings.  While  the 
coefficients of earnings are positive and significant at 1%, those of measured 
and  expected  investments  are  negative  and  significant  too.  This  means  that 
increase in earning will lead to an increase in the spread of value over cost, while 
an increase in assets implies a decline in the spread. Fama and French (1998)   25 
submits that firms are expected to invest when future prospects are good and 
expected profits are high and the forward looking change in assets is expected to 
have  information  about  profits  after  t+2  that  is  missed  by  other  variables. 
However, in reality, the lower the level of investment, the more the fund that will 
be available for distribution as dividend and favourable dividend and earnings 
announcements will increase the value of the firm and ultimately the spread of 
value over cost. The intercepts of equations 3 and 4 are also highly significant.  
The adjusted R
2 are 38.71%, 41.01%, 28.41% and 33.32% for the results 
of equations 1 to 4 respectively. On the basis of low adjusted R
2 values one may 
be  tempted  to  conclude  that  the  models  are  not  suitable  in  terms  of  the 
explanatory power. This temptation should be resisted since it is not unusual for 
the  R
2  values  which  results  from  regression  equations  dealing  with  the 
differences in variables (rather than level of variables) to be generally low. A 
reason advanced for this is that by using change rather than level data, we omit 
the variance to be explained by trend, thus reducing R
2 leaving only the cyclical 
and random components. The random component is actually magnified, because 
the change data add the random elements in two adjacent level observations. As 
the equation is not expected to explain random movement, this further reduces 
the R
2 (Keran and Riordan (1976), Oyejide (1976)).  
  We also introduced dummy variables for the 14 industrial sectors covered 
in the study and also re-estimated equations 1 to 4 to test for industry effects 
(only the equation with significant industry dummies were reported in table V.3, 
others  are  not  reported).  Most  of  the  parameter  estimates  for  the  industry 
dummies were not significant. 
  
Table V.3 Cross Section OLS Regression Results with Industry Effects for 85 firms from 1984-2000   
Dependant variable       
  VCA  VCA  DVC  DVC 
Variables  Eq.1  Eq.2  Eq. 3  Eq.4 
Intercept  0.17  0.18  0.22  0.19 
  1.23  1.16  2.15**  2.06 
ETA  2.9  2.73     
  3.91***  3.73***       26 
dETA  -4.92  -6.44  -2.81  -3.04 
  -3.91***  -5.30***  -4.03***  -3.95*** 
dET2A  0.01  -0.21  0.54  -1.61 
  0.08  -0.31  1.13  -0.32 
dA  -1.58  -1.57  -0.34  -0.4 
  -2.95***  -2.59**  -0.79  -0.89 
d2A  -0.42  -0.56  -0.34  -0.44 
  -2.42**  -3.38***  -2.59**  -3.68*** 
INTA  -0.15  -0.18     
  -1.01  -1.90*     
dINTA  -2.23    -1.3   
  -0.89    -0.97   
dINT2A  -1.12    -0.65   
  -1.07    -0.9   
TDIV  0.11  0.01     
  0.39  0.22     
dTDIV  0.14    0.001   
  2.18**    0.26   
dTDI2V  0.001       
  0.54       
dTDIV2    0.8  0.26   
    1.59  0.71   
dDTDIV    1.67    1.11 
    2.82***    2.50** 
dDIVI        0.34 
        1.96* 
dDINTA    -4.36    1.66 
    -1.14    0.58 
dDINT2A    -1.01     
    -0.76     
dD2INT        -1.52 
        -1.62 
dV2A  0.57  0.66  0.52  0.58 
  3.33***  3.91***  4.37  4.88*** 
D3      -0.23   
      -1.71*   
D8    0.28    0.2 
    1.91*    1.86* 
D9  -0.63  -0.72     
  -2.19**  -2.53**     
Adj. R2  41.79%  45.14%  30.21%  35.46% 
Dur-Wat.  2.05  1.96  1.89  1.78 
         
Source: Author’s computations based on samples. 
The estimates reported here are obtained by using  OLS procedure in Limdep 7.0 (1997 version). 
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
  The coefficients for breweries industry (D3) in equation 3 was negative 
and significant at 10%, Food, Beverages and Tobacco (D8) also have estimates   27 
that are significant at 10%, but positive in equations 2 and 4, while Footwear 
industry (D9) has negative coefficients in equation 1 and 2 that are significant at 
5%  level.  These  results  indicate  that  there  are  some  peculiarities  of  the 
breweries  and  footwear  industries  that  have  negative  impact  on  their  value, 
whereas there are some characteristics of food, beverages and tobacco industry 
that have positive impact over their value. However, the parameter estimates of 
dividend  pay  out  and  change  in  dividend  pay  out  are  positive  while  the 
parameter estimates of debt and change in leverage are negative. These implies 
that there are no tax disadvantage of dividend and tax advantage of debt at the 
industry level for breweries, footwear and food, beverages and tobacco sectors.   
 
V.3 Taxes and Financing Decisions 
  The regression results in equations 1-4 of table 5.4 show that earnings 
and  investment  are  strongly  related  to  the  spread  of  value  over  cost.  These 
variables are expected to provide the control for profitability for the regression 
result  to  be  able  to  capture  tax  effects  in  the  relation  between  value  and 
financing decisions. 
 
V.3.1 Dividends and Taxes 
  The parameter estimates of dividend and change in dividend in equations 
1-4 of table 5.4 are all positive. This is contrary to (Brennan (1970) predictions of 
negative relations between dividends and value because of the tax disadvantage 
of dividends. The positive parameter estimates for dividend in this study reveals 
the positive relationship between the dividend pay out level and earning. The 
positive  relationship  between  dividend  and  value  imply  that  dividend  convey 
information  about  expected  profitability.  The  coefficients  of  the  lagged  and 
future two year changes in dividends also have strong positive relationship with 
value, therefore our regression result fails to produce any negative tax effect in 
the pricing of dividend. Other variables do not pick up all the positive information 
about expected profitability in dividends; therefore the regression cannot identify   28 
tax  effects  in the pricing  of dividend. This  is  similar  to findings  in Fama and 
French (1998). However, previous studies have shown that negative tax effect in 
the pricing of dividends may be empirically weak or non-existent. A negative tax 
effect in the pricing of dividends predicts a positive relation between expected 
stock  return  and  the  proportion  of  the  expected  stock  returns  received  as  a 
dividend, usually proxied by the dividend/price ratio. Black and Scholes (1974), 
Litzenberger and Ramaswany (1979), Blume (1980), Miller and Scholes (1984), 
Long  (1978),  Poterba  (1986),  Hubbard  and  Michaely  (1997)  and  Fama  and 
French  (1998)  find  no  evidence  for  a  negative  tax  effect  in  the  pricing  of 
dividend. 
  Rather, positive relationship between value and dividend in equations 1 
and  2  and  between  the  change  in  value  and  lagged  and  future  change  in 
dividend level in equation 3 and 4 supports the notion that increase in dividend 
pay out level will also bring about a positive change in  value because of the 
information content of dividend. Our findings seem to be more consistent with 
the  non-tax  stories  about  dividends.  Easterbrook  (1984)  argued  that  dividend 
increase  value  by  leaving  managers  with  fewer  resources  to  waste  on  bad 
investments. Lintner (1956) dividend model says that firm targets dividend to 
permanent or expected earnings and past level of dividend. This findings was 
confirmed  by  Oyejide  and  Ariyo,  1984.  Adelegan  (2000,  2003  and  2004) 
concluded that dividend policy of quoted firms in Nigeria are influenced by after 
tax  earnings,  cash flow, economic  policy  changes,  firm  growth  potentials and 
long  term  debt.  Therefore,  dividends  have  information  about  expected 
profitability beyond that contained in measured earnings. 
  Results of our change regression in equation 3 and 4 of table 5.2 also 
confirm  event  study  evidence  that  changes  in  dividends  produce  changes  in 
stock  prices  of  the  same  sign  (Charest  (1978),  Aharony  and  Swary  (1980, 
Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Adelegan (2001). Notwithstanding the fact that 
the  study  examines  longer-term  (two-year)  changes  in  dividends  than  event 
studies,  the  value  responses  observed  are  similar.  For  example  in  Adelegan   29 
(2001),  the  response  of  the  stock  price  to  announcement  of  an  increase  in 
dividend is 0.29 percent.  
 
V.3.2 Taxes and Debt 
  The  relationship  between  value  and  debt  are  negative,  although  the 
coefficients are insignificant in equations 1 to 4 of table 5.2. This shows that 
value  does  not  respond  in  the  same  way  to  changes  in  debt,  dINTt/At  (the 
change in interest expense scaled down by the level of assets), and changes in 
leverage, d(INTt/At) (the change in the ratio of interest to assets). Leverage and 
change in leverage are also negatively correlated with earning and investment 
variables  used  to  control  for  the  information  in  debt  about  profitability. 
Furthermore,  because  dividends  seem  to  have  information  about  expected 
profitability missed by the control variable, the dividend variable may also help to 
isolate the tax effect of debt. Our finding is partly in support of Miller (1977) 
hypothesis  that  debt  has  no  net  tax  benefits.  In  Miller’s  world,  there  is  no 
relation between debt and value when we control for pretax earnings, controlling 
for after tax earnings, the relation is negative. Modigliani and Miller (1963), in 
contrast argue that debt has net tax benefits because in their world, there is a 
positive relation between debt and value after controlling for after-tax earnings. 
The  regression  results  of  equations  1  to  4  in  table  5.2  produce  little  or  no 
evidence  that  debt  has  tax  benefits  that  enhance  firm  value.  Changes  in 
leverage, DDINTA (that is D (INT/At) is positively related with changes in value in 
regression result of equation 4 of table 5.2. 
  However, there is a preponderance of negative relationship between debt 
and value in the regression results in table 5.2.  Many models predict that in the 
absence of a perfect control for profitability, debt variables are likely to have 
negative slopes in regressions to explain value and change in value. According to 
Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), risky 
debts lead to agency problems that can distort investment decisions. To avoid 
these  agency  problems,  profitable  firm  with  strong  growth  opportunities,  and   30 
thus high spread of value over cost are likely to choose lower leverage. Another 
potential  explanation  for  negative  relation  between  debt  and  value  is  the 
asymmetric information model of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). In 
this model, investors know that firms tend to issue risky securities when they are 
overvalued. As a result, new issues meet with price discounts. The prospect of 
such discounts causes firms to follow the pecking order to finance investment, 
first with retained earning, followed by debt and only as a last resort with issue 
of stock. Adelegan (2004) found that the pecking order of financing is applicable 
to  financing  decision  and  dividend  pay  out  of  large  firms  in  Nigeria.  Other 
previous evidences such as Jung et al (1996) and Fama and French (1998) were 
also unable to establish evidence of tax effect of debt. Findings in event studies 
by Eckbo (1986) revealed that changes in debt cause opposite changes in stock 
prices and this is consistent with our findings of a negative relationship between 
value and change in value and debt. 
 
V. 4 Earnings, Investment and Size Effect 
  This study partition the firms into two on the basis of size measured as 
market capitalization (stock price multiplied by shares outstanding). There are 54 
firms in the small –size sub-sample and 31 firms in the big sized sub-sample. 
Table 5.3 panel A and B present the sample summary statistics for the small-
sized and big firms from 1984-2000 respectively. Firms with market capitalization 
less  than  500  million  naira  are  regarded  as  small  firms  while  those  with  500 
million naira and above are regarded as big firms.  
  
Table 5.3 Sample Summary Statistics   
Panel A Sample Summary Statistics  for 54 Small-sized firms  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max   
VCA  0.013  0.47  0.03  1.75   
ETA  0.09  0.14  0.03  0.78   
DETA  0.02  0.11  0.02  0.73   
dET2A  -0.01  0.14  0.07  0.2   
DA  0.18  0.14  0.13  0.87   
d2A  0.38  0.71  0.27  2.2   
INTA  0.15  0.59  0.01  4.36     31 
TDIV  0.28  0.17  0.25  0.91   
DINTA  0.19  0.04  0.002  0.15   
DTDIV  -0.06  0.59  0.01  0.3   
dTDI2V  0.41  2.23  0.08  16.21   
dINT2A  0.04  0.07  0.14  0.28   
dV2A  0.48  0.47  0.55  1.86   
DDINTA  -0.004  0.04  0.002  0.06   
dDINT2A  0.001  0.01  0.06  0.04   
DDTDIV  -0.021  0.01  0.07  0.29   
dTDIV2  -0.02  0.11  0.04  0.45   
DVC  0.11  0.03  0.12  1.38   
dD2INT  -0.003  0.05  0.02  0.21   
DDIVI  -0.023  0.23  0.08  1.09   
Panel B Sample Summary Statistics  for 31 Big-sized firms  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max   
VCA  0.26  0.56  0.05  2.07   
ETA  0.12  0.08  0.08  0.27   
DETA  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.06   
dET2A  0.02  0.05  0.11  0.12   
DA  0.19  0.06  0.06  0.28   
d2A  0.45  0.03  0.05  0.94   
DNTA  0.08  0.07  0.01  0.32   
TDIV  0.30  0.18  0.42  0.62   
INTA  0.02  0.02  0.14  0.08   
DTDIV  0.24  0.01  0.07  0.58   
dTDI2V  0.12  0.17  0.09  0.63   
dINT2A  0.05  0.06  0.13  0.2.4   
dV2A  0.52  0.37  0.12  0.13   
DDINTA  0.002  0.01  0.03  0.03   
dDINT2A  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.28   
DDTDIV  0.003  0.03  0.07  0.07   
dTDIV2  0.02  0.14  0.11  0.72   
DVC  0.23  0.39  0.18  0.18   
dD2INT  0.002  0.06  0.03  0.21   
DDIVI  0.52  0.26  0.14  0.39   
Source: Author’s computations based on samples. 
The estimates reported here are obtained by using  OLS procedure in Limdep 7.0 (1997 version). 
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
           
 
  The average excess of value over cost and earnings after tax for small-
sized  firms  are  1.3%  and  9%  respectively,  while  the  mean  investment  and 
dividend  pay  out  for  small-sized  firm  are  18%  and  28%  respectively.  Mean 
interest on debt scaled by the level of asset for small-sized firms is 15%. 
  The mean excess of value over cost and earnings after tax for big firms 
are 26% and 12% respectively, while the mean investment and dividend pay out   32 
for big firms are 19% and 30% respectively. Mean interest on debt scaled by the 
level of asset for big-sized firms is about 8%.  This implies that bigger firms have 
greater growth potential and they have access to cheaper source of debt, which 
brings about more investment, more profit and more dividends with enhanced 
market values.   
  Equations 1-4 was estimated for the small size firms and the big firms 
separately and the regression results are presented below in table 5. 4 panel A 
and B.  
 
Table 5.4 Cross Section OLS Regression Results for Small and Large-sized firms  
Panel A Cross Section OLS Regression Results for 54 Small-sized firms average for 1984-2000 
Dependant variable VCA  VCA  DVC  DVC       
Variables    Eq.1  Eq.2  Eq.3  Eq.4       
Intercept    0.002  0.14  0.04  0.15       
    (0.02)  (0.76)  (0.37)  (0.17)       
ETA    0.33  (0.81)           
    (0.32)  (0.92)           
dETA    -2.05  -5.49  -2.44  -2.85       
    (-1.37)  (-3.91)***  (-3.86)**  (-4.24)***     
dET2A    0.02  0.32  -0.10  -0.32       
    (0.01)  (0.41)  (-0.2)  (-0.72)       
dA    -0.64  -1.16  -0.01  -0.1       
    (-1.01)  (-1.66)  (-0.03)  (-0.26)       
d2A    -0.26  -5.62  -0.17  -0.3       
    (-1.26)  (-3.11)***  (-1.36)  (-2.83)***     
INTA    -0.24  -0.13           
    (-1.41)  (-1.37)           
dINTA    0.16    -0.21         
    (0.96)    (-0.16)         
dINT2A    -3.02    -1.31         
    (-1.83)*    (-1.62)         
TDIV    0.019  -0.056           
    (0.05)  (-0.13)           
dTDIV    -0.023    0.02         
    (-0.14)    (0.02)         
dTDI2V    -0.55             
    (-0.17)             
dTDIV2      0.45  0.35         
      (0.67)  (0.94)         
dDTDIV      1.7    0.75       
      (2.41)**    (2.01)**       
dDIVI          0.50       
          (2.60)**       
DDINTA      -6.63    4.66         33 
      (-1.48)    (1.60)       
dDINT2A      -10.82           
      (-2.04)**           
dD2INT          -4.43       
          (-2.85)***     
dV2A    0.79  0.83  0.51  0.64       
    (3.67)***  (4.10)***  (4.32)***  (5.61)***       
Adj. R2    27.09%  34.94%  43.24%  53.07%       
Dur-Wat.    2.07  2.2  2.09  2.43       
Panel B Cross Section OLS Regression Results for 31 Big-sized firms average for 1984-2000 
Dependant variable VCA  VCA  DVC  DVC       
Variables    Eq.1  Eq.2  Eq.3  Eq.4       
Intercept    0.83  0.21  0.41  0.15       
    (0.20)  (0.62)  (1.16)  (0.46)       
ETA    7.14  6.40           
    (5.90)***  (5.28)***           
dETA    -6.65  -4.04  -3.26  -5.58       
    (-1.66)  (-1.24)  (-0.79)  (1.42)       
dET2A    -3.51  -4.98  0.54  -0.053       
    (-1.16)  (-1.80)*  (0.16)  (-0.002)       
dA    -2.42  -2.89  -0.57  0.38       
    (-1.77)*  (2.31)**  (-0.33)  (0.24)       
d2A    -0.76E-01  -0.24  -0.85  -0.4       
    (-0.16)  (-0.53)  (-1.57)  (-1.31)       
INTA    1.81  -2.04           
    (0.64)  (-1.72)           
dINTA    -17.89    -1.73         
    (-1.65)    (-0.32)         
dINT2A    -0.92    -1.39         
    (-0.64)    (-0.70)         
TDIV    -0.53  (-0.58)           
    (-0.09)  (-0.08)           
dTDIV    -0.74    0.16         
    (0.63)    (0.46)         
dTDI2V    0.12             
    (0.23)             
dTDIV2      0.35  -1.15         
      (0.42)  (-0.43)         
dDTDIV      2.05    6.91       
      (0.88)    (2.45)**       
dDIVI          -0.19       
          (-0.42)       
dDINTA      -19.87    -10.45       
      (-1.72)    (-0.87)       
dDINT2A      -0.23           
      (-0.18)           
dD2INT          0.22       
          (0.13)       
dV2A    0.58  0.80  0.87  0.80       
    (1.66)  (2.12)**  (1.99)*  (1.84)*         34 
Adj. R2    71.53%  72.08%  0%  15%       
Dur-Wat.    1.97  1.53  1.78  1.85       
Source: Author’s computations based on samples. 
The estimates reported here are obtained by using  OLS procedure in Limdep 7.0 (1997 version). 
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  Table 5.4 shows that lagged / past earnings (DETA) and future two-year 
investment have strong negative relationship with the spread of value over cost 
and future change in value.   These variables are expected to provide a control 
for profitability that allows us to identify tax effects in the relationship between 
value  and  financing.  Table  5.4  on  the  other  hand  revealed  a  strong  positive 
relationship  between  value  and  earnings  and  a  strong  negative  relationship 
between the spread of value over cost and investment. 
 
V. 5 Taxes, Financing Decision and Size Effects 
V.5.1 Taxes, Dividend and Size Effect 
  The  parameter  estimates  for  change  in  dividend  pay  out  (dTDIV)  and 
future  dividend  variable  (dTDI2V)  in  small-firm  sub-sample  in  table  5.4  are 
negative  in  equation  1.  However,  the  coefficient  of  dividend-pay  out  (TDIV) 
which is current dividend level is positive in equation 1 but negative in equation 
2. The negative coefficient of the lagged dividend and future two-year changes 
in dividend from small-sized firms identify the  negative personal tax effect. A 
negative  tax  effect  in  the  pricing  of  dividend  predicts  that  the  firms’  cash 
dividends are less valuable than its equivalent stock dividends.  However, the 
estimates  of  dividend  changes  (dDTDIV,  dDIVI)  are  positive  and  statistically 
significant in equations 2 and 4. On the other hand, the coefficients of dividend 
changes are negative but statistically insignificant in all the equation in table 5.4. 
  In table 5.4 panel B, the big firm sub sample result, the coefficients of 
dividend pay out (TDIV) are negative but insignificant in equation 1 and 2, but 
the coefficient of dividend changes (dDTDIV) are positive and significant in the 
change equation 4.   
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V.5.2 Taxes, Debt and Size Effect 
  The relationship between debt and value in both the small –sized and big 
firms  regression  results  are  negative.  However,  the  coefficients  of  debt  and 
change in leverage (dINT2A, dDINT2A, and dD2INT) are negative and significant 
in both equations 1, 2 and 4 of table 5.4 panel A (Small –sized firms), while they 
are  negative  but insignificant  in  panel  B  (the  big firms).  This  upholds  Miller’s 
hypothesis. Miller (1977) argued that debt has no net tax benefits because the 
personal tax costs of debt just offset corporate tax benefits. In his world there is 
no  relation  between  debt  and  value  when  we  control  for  pretax  earnings, 
controlling for after tax earnings, the relation is negative.    
  For debt to have net tax benefit, Modigliani and Miller (1963) argued that 
the relationship between debt and value should be positive when we control for 
pretax  earnings,  but  there  is  no  relationship  when  they  control  for  after-tax 
earnings. Fama and French (1998) argued that imperfect controls for profitability 
probably may drive the negative relations between debt and value and prevent 
the regression from revealing the tax benefit of debt. The negative relationship 
between the spread of value over cost and changes in value and debt has been 
explained  in  the  literature  as  normal  occurrence  in  the  absence  of  a  perfect 
control for profitability, for example, risky debts can lead to agency problems 
between shareholders and bondholders that can distort investment decisions. To 
prevent  this,  firms  that  are  profitable  and  that  have  strong  opportunities  for 
growth and high spread of value over cost are likely to chose lower leverage. 
This is evidenced in the summary statistics in table 5.3 panels A and B.  
 
VI. Summary, Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
  The  study  use  cross-section  regressions  of  firm  value  on  earnings, 
investment  and  financing  variables  to  measure  tax  effects  in  the  pricing  of 
dividend  and  debt.  Variables  such  as  past,  present  and  future  earnings  and 
investment  expenditure  are  used  to  proxy  for  expected  net  cash  flows.  The 
dividend coefficients in our cross-sectional regression are expected to isolate tax   36 
effects  if  we  could  control  for  information  about  profitability  in  dividend.  We 
found that the relationship between dividend and firm value is positive when we 
pooled all the companies together. The positive relationship between dividend 
and  value  imply  that  dividend  convey  information  about  expected  profitability 
that  is  also  in  earnings  and  investment.  Our  pooled  regression  result  fails  to 
produce any negative tax effect in the pricing of dividend. However, when we 
partitioned the data on the basis of size, the estimates of dividend change of 
small-sized firms are positive and statistically significant, while that of big firms 
are  negative but statistically insignificant. Therefore our partitioned regression 
produced mixed results that is both negative and positive tax effect in the pricing 
of dividend. However, it points more to the fact that there is no tax advantage in 
the pricing of dividend for small-sized firms in Nigeria.  
  If  we  control  for  the  information  about  profitability  in  debt,  the  debt 
slopes  in  our  pooled  cross  sectional  regressions  should  identify  tax  effects. 
However, we found negative insignificant relations between values and leverage 
in  our  pooled  regression  and  negative  significant  relations  between  debt  and 
change  in  leverage  in  our  small-sized  sample.  This  is  consistent  with  Miller 
(1977) hypothesis that debt has no net tax benefit because personal taxes on 
interest  affect  the  corporate  tax  savings.    The  negative  debt  slopes  are  also 
consistent  with  the  general  implications  of  Myers  (1984),  Myers  and  Majluf 
(1984), Miller and Rock (1985). Increases in debt and high level of leverage are 
bad news about value. At high level of leverage, the stockholders- bondholder 
agency  problems  that  arise  when  debt  is  risky  also  predict  negative  relations 
between leverage and profitability (Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). The debt slopes are mixes of tax, agency, asymmetric-information and 
bankruptcy proxy effects and the negative information in debt overwhelm any 
tax benefit of debt. However, earnings and investment key determinants of firm 
value in Nigeria. 
  There is need for government to reduce the level of personal income tax 
and  company  income  tax.  The  prevailing  interest  rate  on  debt  is  high  and  it   37 
discourages firms from seeking debt financing. Government should pursue policy 
handle that will lower the interest rates. There is need for sectoral allocation of 
credit in favour of small-sized manufacturing firms. This will enable them to take 
advantage of the tax benefit from debt financing. Further research in this area 
should also be encouraged. 
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  Appendix 1       
  Table A1 Sectoral Classification and list of Firms 
1AGRICULTURE SECTOR     
1GROMMAC       
2LIVESTOCK FEEDS       
3OKITIPUPA OIL PALM     
4OKOMU OIL PALM       
  AUTOMOBILE &TYRE SECTOR   
5DUNLOP           43 
6INCAR         
7INTRA MOTORS       
8R.T.BRISCOE       
  BREWERIES SECTOR     
9INTERNATIONAL BREWERIES     
10GOLDEN GUINEA BREWERIES   
11GUINNESS NIG.       
12JOS INTERNATIONAL BREWERIES   
13NIGERIA BREWERIES PLC.     
14PREMIER BREWERIES     
  BUILDING MATERIALS SECTOR   
15ASHAKA CEMENT       
16BENUE CEMENT       
17CEMENT OF NORTHERN NIG.     
18NIG.ROPES       
19NIG. WIRE IND.       
20WAPC         
  CHEMICAL & PAINTS SECTOR     
21AFRICAN PAINTS       
22PREMIER PAINTS       
23BERGER PAINTS       
24CAP         
25D N MEYER       
26IPWA         
27NIG-GER. CHEMICALS     
  COMPUTER/OFFICE EQUIPMENT SECTOR 
28NCR         
29HALLMARK PAPER PRODUCT     
30THOMAS WYATT       
31TRIPPLE GEE       
32WTN         
  CONGLOMERATES SECTOR     
33A. LEVENTIS       
34CFAO         
35JOHNHOLT       
36P.Z. INDUSTRIES       
37SCOA NIG.       
38UAC NIG.         
39UTC NIG.         
40UNILEVER NIG.       
  FOOD, BEVERAGES & TOBACCO SECTOR 
417-UP BOTTLING CO.       
42CADBURY NIG.       
43FLOUR MILLS NIG.       
44NORTHERN NIG. FLOUR MILLS   
45NATIONAL SALT CO. NIG.     
46UNION DICON SALT       
47NESTLE NIG.       
48NIG. BOTTLING CO.       
49P.S. MANDRIDES         44 
  FOOTWEAR SECTOR     
50FOOTWEAR & ACCESSORIES     
51LENNARDS NIG.       
  HEALTHCARE SECTOR     
52ABOSELDEHYDE LAB.     
53EKOCORP       
54BCN         
55EVANS MEDICAL       
56MAY & BAKER NIG       
57MORISON IND.       
58NEIMETH INT'L PHARM     
59PHARMA-DEKO       
60SMITHKLINE BEECHAM NIG.     
  INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT SECTOR   
61ALUMINIUM EXTRUSION IND.     
62ALUMINIUM MAN. CO (NIG)     
63BOC GASES NIG.       
64FIRST ALUMINIUM NIG.     
65NIG. ENAMELWARE     
66NIG. YEAST & ALCOHOL (MAN)   
67VITAFOAM (NIG)       
68VONO PRODUCTS       
  PACKAGING SECTOR     
69ABPLAST PRODUCTS     
70AVON CROWNCAPS &CONTAINERS (NIG) 
71DELTA GLASS       
72CARNAUD METAL BOX NIG.     
73POLY PRODUCTS NIG     
74STUDIO PRESS NIG.     
75VANLEER CONTAINERS NIG.     
76W.A. GLASS IND.       
  PUBLISHING & PRINTING SECTOR   
77ACADEMY PRESS       
78LONGMAN NIG.       
79UNIVERSITY PRESS     
  TEXTILE SECTOR       
80ABA TEXTILES MILLS     
81ASABA TEXTILES MILLS     
82AFPRINT NIG.       
83ENPEE IND.       
84NIG. TEXTILES MILLS     
85UNITED NIG. TEXTILES     
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange: Fact book, various issues. 
           
 